{"id":34635,"date":"2026-11-13T15:13:53","date_gmt":"2026-11-13T15:13:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.earth-site.co.uk\/Education\/the-2022-coups-in-burkina-faso-explained\/"},"modified":"2026-11-13T15:19:01","modified_gmt":"2026-11-13T15:19:01","slug":"the-2022-coups-in-burkina-faso-explained","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.earth-site.co.uk\/Education\/the-2022-coups-in-burkina-faso-explained\/","title":{"rendered":"The 2022 Coups in Burkina Faso Explained"},"content":{"rendered":"

It’s fair to say that 2022 was a turbulent year for Burkina Faso<\/a>, witnessing not one, but two military coups. Essentially, the first coup in January saw Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba oust elected President Roch Marc Christian Kabor\u00e9, citing Kabor\u00e9’s inability to tackle the escalating jihadist insurgency. Then, just eight months later in September, Captain Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 led another coup, removing Damiba from power with similar justifications \u2013 a perceived failure to improve security and address public discontent. Both events were deeply rooted in the country’s worsening security crisis, a complex web of factors including a spreading jihadist threat, internal military frustrations, and a general erosion of trust in the government’s capacity to protect its citizens.<\/p>\n

The January 2022 Coup: Damiba’s Rise to Power<\/h2>\n

The initial military takeover in Burkina Faso at the beginning of 2022 wasn’t entirely a surprise for those watching the region closely. Tensions had been simmering for months, largely fuelled by the government’s perceived failure to address the escalating insecurity across the country.<\/p>\n

Growing Discontent Under Kabor\u00e9<\/h3>\n

Before the January coup, President Roch Marc Christian Kabor\u00e9, who had been re-elected for a second term in 2020, faced a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Jihadist groups, linked to both al-Qaeda and Islamic State, had significantly expanded their reach, particularly in the northern and eastern regions. These groups carried out frequent attacks on civilians and security forces, leading to thousands of deaths and millions displaced from their homes.<\/p>\n

The government’s response was widely seen as insufficient and ineffective. There was a palpable sense of frustration among the populace and within the military ranks. Soldiers often felt underequipped, underpaid, and poorly supported in their fight against a well-resourced and increasingly sophisticated enemy. Public protests against the government’s handling of the crisis became more frequent, with calls for Kabor\u00e9 to resign or take more decisive action. This created fertile ground for a military intervention.<\/p>\n

The Spark: Insecurity and Military Frustration<\/h3>\n

While the discontent was widespread, a specific incident often cited as a key catalyst was the Inata attack in November 2021. A gendarmerie post in Inata, Soum province, was overrun by jihadists, resulting in the deaths of at least 53 people, mostly gendarmes. This attack, and the reports that the gendarmes had been without adequate food and supplies for days, sparked outrage across the country. It underscored the military’s grievances regarding poor conditions and a lack of resources, and further eroded public trust in Kabor\u00e9’s leadership.<\/p>\n

Following this, soldiers began to voice their frustrations more openly, demanding better equipment, more resources, and a clearer strategy to combat the insurgency. These demands escalated, with some military personnel directly questioning the competence of the high command and, by extension, the political leadership.<\/p>\n

Damiba’s Seizure of Power<\/h3>\n

On 24 January 2022, soldiers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, announced that they had seized power. The coup plotters, organised under the banner of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), dissolved the government and parliament, suspended the constitution, and closed the country’s borders. They cited the “deteriorating security situation and the inability of the government to unite the Burkinab\u00e8 people” as their primary reasons for intervention.<\/p>\n

Kabor\u00e9 was detained, and his resignation was subsequently announced, though it was unclear whether it was voluntary. Damiba, who had been a high-ranking officer in the army and was seen by some as a rising star, presented himself as the man to bring stability and a new direction to the fight against terrorism. He pledged to restore security and unity, promising a return to constitutional order after a transitional period.<\/p>\n

The Short-Lived Damiba Regime<\/h2>\n

Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba’s time in power was brief, lasting just over eight months. He inherited a deeply entrenched security crisis and an increasingly disillusioned populace. While he initially enjoyed some public support due to the widespread frustration with Kabor\u00e9, he quickly faced the same challenges, and then some.<\/p>\n

Initial Promises and Public Expectations<\/h3>\n

Upon taking power, Damiba’s MPSR made several pledges. Chief among them was to make the fight against jihadist groups the absolute priority. He promised to reorganise the armed forces, improve their equipment, and boost morale. There was also a commitment to return to constitutional rule within a reasonable timeframe, with regional bodies like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) pushing for a swift transition.<\/p>\n

Initially, many Burkinab\u00e8 welcomed<\/a> the coup, viewing it as a necessary evil to shake up a stagnant political system and address the spiralling insecurity. There was a sense of hope that a military leader, particularly one with Damiba’s combat experience, would be more effective in tackling the complex insurgency. Public demonstrations of support for the MPSR were seen in the days following the coup.<\/p>\n

Failure to Deliver on Security Pledges<\/h3>\n

Despite the initial optimism, Damiba’s regime struggled significantly to improve the security situation. Attacks by jihadist groups continued unabated, and in some areas, even intensified. The displacement crisis worsened, and the economy, already fragile, continued to suffer.<\/p>\n

One of the key criticisms was the perceived lack of a clear, decisive strategy. While Damiba spoke of a “total war” against terrorism, the on-the-ground reality often reflected the same challenges that plagued Kabor\u00e9’s administration: poorly equipped soldiers, logistical shortcomings, and a persistent inability to protect civilian populations effectively. The promise of a rapid improvement in security proved difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in such a short period, especially given the deeply rooted nature of the insurgency.<\/p>\n

Growing Disillusionment and Internal Divisions<\/h3>\n

As the security situation failed to improve, public disillusionment with Damiba’s leadership grew. The initial goodwill began to evaporate, replaced by renewed frustration and anger. Protests, which had initially supported the coup, started to turn against Damiba, with people demanding concrete results in the fight against terrorism.<\/p>\n

Crucially, divisions also began to emerge within the military itself. Some factions felt that Damiba was not moving fast enough, or that his strategies were ineffective. There were whispers of discontent among junior officers and lower ranks who believed their sacrifices were not being adequately recognised and that the MPSR leadership was becoming too comfortable in power. This internal military discontent, mirroring the public’s sentiment, laid the groundwork for the second coup.<\/p>\n

The September 2022 Coup: Traor\u00e9 Takes Control<\/h2>\n

The political landscape in Burkina Faso was once again dramatically altered in September 2022, as Captain Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 led a swift and decisive coup, ousting Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. This second coup within the year was a stark demonstration of the fragility of power and the ongoing deep-seated frustrations within the military regarding the security crisis.<\/p>\n

The Immediate Precursors to the Coup<\/h3>\n

The lead-up to Traor\u00e9’s takeover was marked by a steady erosion of confidence in Damiba’s ability to govern and, more specifically, to contain the escalating jihadist insurgency. Several key events and sentiments fuelled the impending change:<\/p>\n

Firstly, the security situation continued to deteriorate significantly. While Damiba had promised to prioritise the fight against terrorism, attacks by various armed groups intensified, particularly in the northern and eastern regions. Roads became increasingly unsafe, and more towns found themselves cut off from supply lines.<\/p>\n

Secondly, a particularly devastating attack in the Gaskind\u00e9 area in September 2022, where a supply convoy heading to the besieged town of Djibo was ambushed, killing at least 27 soldiers and 10 civilians, was a major blow. The ambush, which saw widespread casualties and significant equipment losses, deeply angered many within the military ranks. It highlighted the continued vulnerability of security forces and the perception that Damiba’s leadership was failing to provide effective protection or strategy.<\/p>\n

Finally, there were growing rumours and open criticisms within the military that Damiba was neglecting the frontline troops and becoming too focused on political maneuvering in the capital, Ouagadougou. Some accused him of becoming too close to regional and international powers, particularly France, without showing tangible improvements on the ground. This bred resentment among certain sections of the army, particularly among younger officers who felt their concerns were not being addressed.<\/p>\n

Traor\u00e9’s Motivations and Justifications<\/h3>\n

Captain Ibrahim Traor\u00e9, who was previously the head of the special forces unit “Cobra” in the northern region, emerged as the leader of the new faction. On the evening of 30 September 2022, he appeared on national television, flanked by soldiers, to announce that Damiba had been deposed.<\/p>\n

Traor\u00e9’s primary justifications for the coup were almost identical to Damiba’s own reasons for ousting Kabor\u00e9: the persistent inability to improve the security situation and to effectively combat the jihadist groups. He stated that Damiba had “deviated from the ideal of the MPSR” and failed to deliver on his promises to restore security and stabilise the country.<\/p>\n

Crucially, Traor\u00e9 and his supporters also accused Damiba of focusing too much on consolidating his own power rather than addressing the urgent needs of the military and the population. There was also a strong undercurrent of anti-French sentiment, with some elements of Traor\u00e9’s group suggesting that Damiba was overly reliant on France, and that a more independent approach was needed to tackle the security crisis. This resonated with a segment of the population that believed foreign involvement was not helping.<\/p>\n

The Aftermath and Traor\u00e9’s Ascent<\/h3>\n

The coup was relatively swift, although there was some initial confusion and sporadic gunfire in Ouagadougou. Damiba initially resisted, but after mediation efforts by religious and traditional leaders, he eventually agreed to step down on 2 October, fleeing to Togo.<\/p>\n

Traor\u00e9 quickly consolidated his power, dissolving the government, suspending the constitution, and closing borders. He was subsequently appointed interim president. His ascent was seen by many as a reflection of the younger, more radical elements within the military gaining influence, particularly those on the front lines of the fight against the jihadists. He promised a more aggressive approach to the insurgency, including strengthening military capabilities and potentially seeking new international partners, hinting at a shift away from traditional alliances.<\/p>\n

The Enduring Security Crisis: A Root Cause<\/h2>\n

It’s impossible to discuss the 2022 coups in Burkina Faso without consistently circling back to the unrelenting and deeply destructive security crisis that has plagued the nation for years. This isn’t just a contributing factor; it is fundamentally the root cause and the primary justification for both military takeovers.<\/p>\n

The Spread of Jihadist Insurgency<\/h3>\n

Burkina Faso, once relatively stable compared to its neighbours Mali<\/a> and Niger, has been increasingly engulfed by a burgeoning jihadist insurgency since around 2015. Groups linked to both al-Qaeda (such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, JNIM) and Islamic State (particularly Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, ISGS) have exploited the porous borders with Mali and Niger, and the presence of ungoverned spaces.<\/p>\n

These groups initially targeted security forces but have steadily expanded their attacks to include civilians, religious leaders, and traditional authorities. Their tactics are brutal, involving ambushes, roadside bombs, kidnappings, and massacres. They seek to destabilise the state, control territory, and impose their strict interpretations of Islamic law in areas where state presence is weak or non-existent.<\/p>\n

Humanitarian Catastrophe and State Collapse<\/h3>\n

The consequences of this insurgency have been catastrophic. Millions of people have been displaced from their homes, forced to flee violence and seek refuge in urban centres or other relatively safer areas. These internally displaced persons (IDPs) often live in precarious conditions, reliant on humanitarian aid that is frequently difficult to deliver due to insecurity.<\/p>\n

Entire regions, particularly in the north, east, and Sahel, have become virtually ungovernable. Schools and health centres have closed, markets have shut down, and vital transportation routes are frequently attacked. This has led to a collapse of essential state services in many areas, creating a vacuum that jihadist groups exploit to gain influence and recruit disillusioned youth. The humanitarian crisis is escalating, with a growing number of people facing severe food insecurity due to disrupted agricultural activities and restricted movement.<\/p>\n

Military Frustration and Ineffectiveness<\/h3>\n

The military, tasked with confronting these well-armed and adaptable jihadist groups, has faced immense challenges. Soldiers often report being underequipped, poorly trained for counter-insurgency warfare, and lacking adequate logistical support. The sheer scale of the conflict, combined with the dispersed nature of the enemy, has stretched the armed forces thin.<\/p>\n

Morale within the military has plummeted, leading to significant frustration among the rank and file. They perceive a disconnect between their sacrifices on the front lines and the perceived incompetence or indifference of their leadership, both military and political. This frustration was a critical ingredient in the build-up to both coups, as soldiers felt that political leaders (Kabor\u00e9) and then military leaders (Damiba) were failing to provide the decisive action and effective strategy needed to turn the tide. The coups were, in essence, attempts by sections of the military to reset the approach to this intractable and deeply destabilising conflict.<\/p>\n

Regional and International Reactions<\/h2>\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Metric<\/th>\nDetails<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Date of First Coup<\/td>\n24 January 2022<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Date of Second Coup<\/td>\n30 September 2022<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Location<\/td>\nOuagadougou, Burkina Faso<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Leaders Involved<\/td>\nLieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba (First Coup), Captain Ibrahim Traoré (Second Coup)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Reason for Coups<\/td>\nMilitary dissatisfaction with government’s handling of Islamist insurgency<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Impact on Government<\/td>\nOverthrow of President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré (First Coup), Removal of Damiba (Second Coup)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
International Response<\/td>\nCondemnation by ECOWAS and African Union, Calls for return to civilian rule<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Security Situation Post-Coups<\/td>\nContinued instability and ongoing conflict with jihadist groups<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The 2022 coups in Burkina Faso did not occur in isolation. They sent ripples across West Africa and drew strong reactions from international partners, highlighting the complex web of regional security dynamics and the challenge of promoting democratic governance in a volatile environment.<\/p>\n

ECOWAS’s Stance and Sanctions<\/h3>\n

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took a firm stance against both coups, consistent with its established protocols against unconstitutional changes of government. Following the January coup that ousted Kabor\u00e9, ECOWAS swiftly suspended Burkina Faso from its decision-making bodies and imposed sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes on the junta members. The regional bloc demanded a clear timetable for a return to constitutional order.<\/p>\n

However, the efficacy of these sanctions was debatable. While they put pressure on the military leaders, they also risked exacerbating the humanitarian situation and alienating the population, who often viewed ECOWAS as being out of touch with their immediate security concerns. The second coup, led by Traor\u00e9, posed an even greater challenge to ECOWAS’s authority. While Traor\u00e9 also faced suspension and condemnation, the regional body’s ability to enforce its demands seemed to wane, given the successive nature of the coups and the junta’s own populist appeal domestically. ECOWAS ultimately engaged in mediation efforts with both Damiba and Traor\u00e9, trying to negotiate transition timelines and ensure civilian protection, but its leverage appeared limited.<\/p>\n

French Influence and Shifting Alliances<\/h3>\n

France, as Burkina Faso’s former colonial power<\/a>, has historically maintained a significant influence in the country, particularly through military cooperation in the fight against jihadism. French forces were present in the Sahel region, including Burkina Faso, as part of Operation Barkhane and later Task Force Takuba.<\/p>\n

The January coup saw a somewhat cautious reaction from France, which condemned the takeover but largely focused on the safety of its citizens. However, with the second coup and Traor\u00e9’s rise, anti-French sentiment became much more pronounced. Traor\u00e9’s supporters often criticised Damiba for being too close to France and called for a re-evaluation of security partnerships. There were public protests outside the French embassy in Ouagadougou, with some protestors waving Russian flags, suggesting a desire for alternative international partners.<\/p>\n

This shift reflects a broader trend in the Sahel, where some countries are increasingly questioning traditional alliances with France and exploring partnerships with other global powers, notably Russia. The French government, while reaffirming its commitment to the region, has had to navigate this complex and often hostile political landscape, leading to a re-evaluation of its military presence and diplomatic strategies.<\/p>\n

Broader Geopolitical Implications<\/h3>\n

The coups in Burkina Faso have broader geopolitical implications, contributing to a “coup belt” across West Africa, alongside Mali and Guinea. This trend raises concerns about democratic backsliding in a region already grappling with poverty, climate change, and weak governance.<\/p>\n

The instability creates opportunities for external actors, including Russia, to expand their influence, often through military and security cooperation. The Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, has already established a controversial presence in neighbouring Mali, and there were concerns that Traor\u00e9’s regime might follow suit, particularly given the anti-French rhetoric. Such shifts could fundamentally alter regional power dynamics and complicate international efforts to combat terrorism and promote stability. The international community faces a delicate balancing act: condemning unconstitutional changes while also addressing the underlying security and humanitarian crises that fuel popular discontent and military interventions.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

FAQs<\/h2>\n

<\/p>\n

What were the main causes of the 2022 coups in Burkina Faso?<\/h3>\n

The 2022 coups in Burkina Faso were primarily driven by widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s inability to effectively combat escalating violence from jihadist groups. Factors such as economic hardship, political instability, and a lack of security contributed to public unrest and military discontent, ultimately leading to the overthrow of the government.<\/p>\n

Who were the key figures involved in the coups?<\/h3>\n

The key figures in the 2022 coups included Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who led the first coup in January 2022, and subsequently became the transitional president. Other military leaders and factions within the armed forces played significant roles in orchestrating the coups and supporting Damiba’s rise to power.<\/p>\n

What was the international response to the coups?<\/h3>\n

The international response to the coups in Burkina Faso included condemnation<\/a> from various governments and organisations, including the African Union and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). These entities called for a return to constitutional order and expressed concerns over the implications for regional stability and security.<\/p>\n

How did the coups affect the security situation in Burkina Faso?<\/h3>\n

The coups initially led to a temporary increase in military operations against jihadist groups, as the new leadership sought to demonstrate its commitment to improving security. However, the overall security situation remained precarious, with ongoing attacks and violence continuing to pose significant challenges for the government and the civilian population.<\/p>\n

What are the implications of the coups for Burkina Faso’s future?<\/h3>\n

The implications of the coups for Burkina Faso’s future<\/a> include potential long-term instability and challenges in governance. The military’s takeover may hinder democratic processes and exacerbate existing tensions within society. Additionally, the ongoing security crisis could complicate efforts to rebuild trust in government institutions and address the root causes of violence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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