Why Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger Formed the Alliance of Sahel States

So, why did Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger decide to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)? In a nutshell, it boils down to a shared sense of disillusionment with existing security partnerships, particularly with France and ECOWAS, coupled with a pressing need for a more effective and regionally driven response to the escalating jihadist insurgency. They saw a critical gap in collective defence and economic development, which they believed could only be filled by a closer, self-reliant alliance among themselves.

The Genesis of a New Alliance: A Shared Security Predicament

The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on 16 September 2023 was not an overnight decision but rather the culmination of years of mounting frustration and a deeply felt need for a new approach to regional security. For Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the prevailing security situation had become untenable, characterised by persistent jihadist violence, massive internal displacement, and a pervasive sense of state fragility. Existing frameworks and partnerships, which had been in place for years, were increasingly perceived as inadequate, if not outright counterproductive.

Mounting Jihadist Insurgency and State Vulnerability

For over a decade, the central Sahel region has been grappling with a relentless surge in activity from various jihadist groups, including affiliates of Al-Qaeda (such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, JNIM) and the Islamic State (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, ISGS). These groups have exploited porous borders, weak governance, and socio-economic grievances to establish a significant presence, conducting widespread attacks on military targets, civilian populations, and infrastructure. The human cost has been immense, with thousands killed and millions displaced, leading to a humanitarian crisis of significant proportions.

Each of the three states has experienced substantial territorial losses and a profound erosion of state authority in vast swathes of their countries. The capacity of their respective national armies, despite external training and support, has often been overwhelmed by the scale and tactics of the insurgents. This shared vulnerability created a powerful impetus for a more robust and coordinated regional defence strategy. The feeling was that individual national efforts, even with external assistance, were simply not enough to contain, let alone defeat, the insurgency. The idea of pooling resources and intelligence, and presenting a united front, began to gain traction as a matter of urgent necessity.

Disillusionment with Traditional Security Partners

A significant driver behind the AES’s formation was a growing disillusionment with the effectiveness and perceived intentions of traditional security partners, particularly France. For many years, France had maintained a substantial military presence in the Sahel, initially through Operation Serval and later Operation Barkhane, aimed at counter-terrorism efforts. However, despite these interventions, the security situation continued to deteriorate, leading to questions about the strategy’s efficacy.

Accusations of France pursuing its own strategic interests rather than genuinely addressing the root causes of the insecurity became increasingly vocal. There were also concerns about the limited impact of foreign military operations on the ground, often seen as failing to protect civilian populations effectively. This sentiment was exacerbated by a strong undercurrent of anti-French sentiment, rooted in colonial history and amplified by state-backed media campaigns in the wake of the coups in all three nations. The perception grew that external actors were not only failing to solve the problem but were potentially contributing to its complexity or prolonging it. This created a vacuum and a strong desire to take ownership of their own security destiny.

The Push for Self-Reliance and Regional Sovereignty

The coups d’état in Mali (2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) undeniably served as catalysts for the formation of the AES. These military takeovers, while condemned by international bodies, were often framed domestically as necessary steps to address the perceived failures of civilian governments to tackle insecurity and to assert greater national sovereignty. A key theme emerging from these transitional governments has been a strong emphasis on self-reliance in security and defence matters, moving away from what they view as dependency on external powers.

Reclaiming Agency and Reshaping Defence Strategy

The new military leaders in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey have consistently articulated a vision of greater autonomy in defence and foreign policy. This has involved a strategic pivot away from traditional Western partners and a conscious effort to strengthen internal capabilities. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Burkina Faso, and the subsequent demand for their departure from Niger, symbolises this shift. These actions were not merely reactive but part of a deliberate strategy to take full command of their respective security operations.

The formation of the AES represents a tangible manifestation of this commitment to self-reliance. By creating a mutual defence pact, the three states aim to pool their military resources, intelligence, and expertise to form a more coherent and effective regional security force. This allows them to define their own operational strategies, deploy forces as they deem necessary, and avoid the perceived constraints and conditionalities often associated with foreign military assistance. It’s about having the final say and tailoring solutions to their specific contexts rather than adapting to externally imposed frameworks.

Diversifying Partnerships and Geopolitical Realignment

Parallel to the push for self-reliance, there has been a noticeable diversification of partnerships, signalling a significant geopolitical realignment in the region. The transitional governments have actively sought new allies and collaborators, particularly in areas where they believe their security needs can be better met. This includes engaging with countries like Russia, which has increased its presence in Mali and Burkina Faso through military contractors and security cooperation agreements.

This diversification is not solely about replacing old partners with new ones but also about strengthening their negotiating position on the international stage. By demonstrating a willingness to explore alternative alliances, they aim to secure more favourable terms for security assistance, economic development, and diplomatic support. The AES, therefore, also functions as a diplomatic bloc, enhancing their collective voice and influence in regional and international forums, allowing them to advocate for their interests more effectively without being beholden to any single power.

Economic Integration and Development Aspirations

Beyond the immediate security imperative, the Alliance of Sahel States also signals a deeper ambition for economic integration and sustainable development. The three countries share similar socio-economic challenges, including widespread poverty, limited infrastructure, and vulnerability to climate change. They believe that a closer union can unlock new opportunities for trade, investment, and collaborative development projects, ultimately contributing to long-term stability.

Addressing Shared Economic Challenges

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are among the least developed countries globally, facing structural economic weaknesses. Landlocked and heavily reliant on agriculture, they are particularly susceptible to external shocks, such as fluctuating commodity prices and the impacts of climate change, including desertification and erratic rainfall. The persistent insecurity further exacerbates these challenges, disrupting livelihoods, displacing populations, and deterring investment.

The AES seeks to create a more resilient economic bloc by fostering intra-regional trade and cooperation. This could involve harmonising trade policies, improving cross-border infrastructure, and jointly developing key sectors such as agriculture, energy, and mining. By working together, they hope to overcome the limitations of their individual national markets and attract greater investment by presenting a larger, more unified economic front. The idea is that collective action can yield better results than individual, fragmented efforts in addressing the deep-seated economic issues that often fuel instability.

Breaking Free from Regional Economic Constraints

A crucial element of the AES’s economic vision is a perceived desire to break free from what they view as restrictive or unhelpful regional economic frameworks, particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following their respective coups were deeply resented and seen as counterproductive, further hindering their development efforts. These sanctions, which included border closures and restrictions on financial transactions, intensified the economic hardship for ordinary citizens and were interpreted as an attempt to undermine their sovereignty.

By forming their own economic alliance, the AES countries aim to establish alternative trade routes, reduce their reliance on ECOWAS-controlled transport corridors, and develop internal mechanisms for financial transactions. While fully detaching from the broader West African economic system is a complex and long-term endeavour, the AES represents a clear signal of intent to explore new avenues for economic cooperation that are aligned with their political and security priorities. This includes exploring options for a shared currency or greater financial integration to circumvent dependence on external financial systems.

ECOWAS’s Stance and Regional Dynamics

The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States has significantly reshaped the regional political landscape, particularly in its relationship with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS, which has historically played a central role in regional integration and conflict resolution, found itself at odds with the transitional governments in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey following the coups.

Tensions with ECOWAS and Mutual Suspicion

ECOWAS adopted a firm stance against the unconstitutional changes of government in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, imposing sanctions and demanding a swift return to civilian rule. These measures were met with strong defiance by the military juntas, who viewed them as external interference in their internal affairs and an attempt to undermine their sovereignty. The rhetoric from all three capitals frequently accused ECOWAS of being manipulated by external powers, specifically France, and of failing to understand the unique security challenges faced by the Sahelian states.

The sanctions, which included closure of borders, suspension of financial transactions, and travel bans on junta members, exacerbated economic hardship for the populations and further alienated the transitional governments from ECOWAS. This created a deep chasm of distrust and suspicion. The military leaders argued that ECOWAS’s focus on constitutional transitions overlooked the immediate and existential threat posed by jihadism, which they claimed was the primary driver of their interventions. They felt that ECOWAS was not adequately supporting their security efforts and was instead imposing punitive measures.

The Threat of Withdrawal and a Divided Bloc

The tensions escalated to the point where all three states formally announced their intention to withdraw from ECOWAS in January 2024. This unprecedented move represents a profound challenge to the regional body’s authority and its founding principles of integration. The stated reasons for withdrawal included allegations that ECOWAS had become a threat to its member states and that it had failed to assist them in their fight against terrorism.

The potential departure of three significant member states, which together represent a substantial geographical area and population, would significantly weaken ECOWAS. It would also create a fragmented regional architecture, with two distinct blocs operating with potentially diverging agendas. This situation raises serious questions about the future of West African integration, cross-border cooperation, and the mechanisms for regional security and economic development. The decision to withdraw underscores the AES members’ commitment to forging an independent path, even if it means disrupting long-standing regional frameworks.

The Path Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

Metric Burkina Faso Mali Niger Alliance of Sahel States
Year of Formation 2023 2023 2023 2023
Primary Security Concern Jihadist insurgency Jihadist insurgency Jihadist insurgency Counter-terrorism cooperation
Military Expenditure (% of GDP) 3.5% 4.0% 2.8% Combined focus on defence
Population (millions) 21.5 20.3 25.1 67.0 (approx.)
GDP Growth Rate (2022) 6.0% 5.5% 6.2% Regional economic stability goal
Common Challenges Political instability, terrorism Political instability, terrorism Political instability, terrorism Enhanced regional security and cooperation
International Support Limited due to sanctions Reduced due to sanctions Moderate Self-reliance emphasis

The Alliance of Sahel States faces a complex and uncertain future, fraught with both significant challenges and potential opportunities. Its long-term success will hinge on its ability to translate its ambitious goals into tangible results, particularly in the realm of security and economic development, while navigating intricate regional and international dynamics.

Overcoming Internal Hurdles and External Pressures

One of the primary challenges for the AES will be to effectively operationalise its mutual defence pact. This requires deep coordination among their national armies, harmonisation of military doctrines, and the establishment of robust command and control structures. All three countries are resource-constrained and face immense logistical challenges, making sustained, large-scale joint operations difficult. Building a truly integrated and effective security force will demand significant investment, training, and a sustained political commitment from all three governments.

Economically, the AES countries must contend with the impacts of their potential withdrawal from ECOWAS, which could disrupt existing trade routes and economic partnerships. They will need to forge new economic links and develop alternative markets to mitigate any negative consequences. Furthermore, the political instability stemming from the coups and the ongoing security crisis continues to deter foreign investment, making economic recovery and growth a formidable task. They also face continued international pressure regarding their democratic transitions and human rights records, which could affect access to vital development aid and partnerships.

Potential for a New Model of Regional Cooperation

Despite these hurdles, the formation of the AES presents an opportunity to forge a new model of regional cooperation tailored to the specific needs and realities of the central Sahel. If successful, it could demonstrate that African nations can take greater ownership of their security and development challenges, reducing reliance on external actors. By pooling resources and expertise, they may be able to develop more effective, locally adapted strategies to counter the jihadist threat and foster sustainable development.

The alliance could also serve as a platform for intensified diplomatic engagement and advocacy on the international stage, allowing the three states to collectively articulate their perspectives and priorities. While challenging, the long-term vision of economic integration, including shared infrastructure projects and harmonised policies, holds the potential to unlock significant economic growth and improve the livelihoods of millions. The success or failure of the AES will undoubtedly have far-reaching implications for the stability and future trajectory of the entire Sahel region and potentially reshape the broader geopolitical landscape of West Africa.

FAQs

What is the Alliance of Sahel States?

The Alliance of Sahel States, also known as the G5 Sahel, is a regional cooperation framework established by Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in 2014. Its primary aim is to enhance security and development in the Sahel region, which faces significant challenges from terrorism, organised crime, and socio-economic instability.

Why did Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger form this alliance?

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formed the alliance to collectively address the escalating security threats posed by extremist groups and to improve regional stability. The collaboration allows these countries to share resources, intelligence, and strategies to combat terrorism and promote development initiatives in the region.

What are the main objectives of the Alliance of Sahel States?

The main objectives of the Alliance of Sahel States include enhancing security cooperation among member states, promoting sustainable development, addressing humanitarian needs, and fostering economic growth. The alliance aims to create a coordinated response to the multifaceted challenges faced by the Sahel region.

How does the Alliance of Sahel States operate?

The Alliance operates through joint military operations, intelligence sharing, and collaborative development projects. It also engages with international partners and organisations to secure funding and support for its initiatives, thereby strengthening its capacity to address regional challenges effectively.

What challenges does the Alliance of Sahel States face?

The Alliance faces several challenges, including limited resources, political instability within member states, and the complex nature of security threats in the region. Additionally, the alliance must navigate relationships with external powers and address the humanitarian crises resulting from ongoing conflicts and displacement.

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